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A widely held notion holds that freely floating exchange rates are excessively 
volatile when judged against fundamentals and when moving from fixed to 
floating exchange rates. We re-examine the data and conclude that the disparity 
between the fundamentals and exchange rate volatility is more apparent than real, 
especially when the Deutsche Mark, rather than the dollar is chosen as the 
numeraire currency. We also argue, and indeed demonstrate, that in cross-regime 
comparisons one has to account for certain ‘missing variables’ which compensate 
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The early proponents of flexible exchange rates (see, for example, Friedman, 1953, Sohmen, 
1961 and Johnson, 1958) viewed the fixed but adjustable Bretton Woods exchange rate 
arrangement as inherently unstable, because it failed to provide an effective adjustment 
mechanism. In contrast, a regime of flexible exchange rates was regarded as providing an 
automatic adjustment mechanism and flexible rates were therefore predicted to be inherently 
stable. However, the post-Bretton Woods and inter-war experiences with flexible exchange rates 
suggest that exchange rates when left to their own devices are inherently volatile. Of course, this 
does not mean that such rates are excessively volatile, since as Friedman recognized, if the 
underlying fundamentals are unstable then exchange rates are likely to be unstable as well:  
Instability of exchange rates is a symptom of instability in the underlying 
economic structure. Elimination of this symptom by administrative freezing of 
exchange rates cures none of the underlying difficulties and only makes 
adjustment to them more painful. (Friedman, 1953) 
However, the so-called exchange rate disconnect discussed in Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) 
summarizes a widely held belief in the profession that exchange rates have indeed been 
excessively volatile with respect to traditional macroeconomic variables in the post-Bretton 
Woods period.
1 There are two aspects to this volatility disconnect in the literature, and we label 
these inter- and intra-regime volatility. Inter-regime volatility refers to the striking result that in 
moving from a system of fixed to floating exchange rates, the volatility of macroeconomic 
fundamentals, such as the money stock and income, does not change, but the volatility of the 
exchange rate does. The concept of intra-regime volatility refers to the view that in floating 
exchange rate regimes exchange rates appear to be excessively volatile with respect to the 
fundamentals. 
The issue of inter-regime volatility has been made in a number of papers. For example, Baxter 
and Stockman (1989) examine the variability of output, trade variables, private and government 
consumption and the real exchange rate and are “unable to find evidence that the cyclical 
behavior of real macroeconomic aggregates depends systematically on the exchange rate regime. 
The only exception is the well-known case of the real exchange rate.” Flood and Rose (1995) use 
flexible price and sticky price variants of the monetary model to show that the volatility of their 
so-called ‘traditional fundamentals’ (money and income) stays roughly unchanged in the move 
from the Bretton Woods to the post-Bretton Woods regime but that the volatility of virtual 
fundamentals (the exchange rate minus the interest rate differential) increases dramatically. Flood 
and Rose (1999) present a similar exercise in which they compare the volatility of fundamentals 
(including the interest differential) with exchange rate volatility per se for the Bretton Woods and 
                                                      
1The exchange rate disconnect also refers to the apparent difficulty in forecasting (the level of) exchange 
rates, although this is not uncontroversial. 
  2the post- Bretton Woods period and again find that the volatility of the exchange rate dominates 
the volatility of the fundamentals.
2
The notion of intra-regime volatility has also been investigated. For example, Frankel and Meese 
(1987) note that in the post-Bretton Woods regime nominal exchange rates are clearly more 
volatile than a standard set of macroeconomic fundamentals, such as money supplies and output, 
suggest. However, they are careful to avoid referring to this as excess exchange rate volatility 
since, for example, modifications to exchange rate models along the lines of introducing 
heterogeneous expectations, instead of rational expectations, may resolve the puzzle. MacDonald 
(1999) makes a similar point. Nonetheless, the view that exchange rates are more volatile than 
macroeconomic fundamentals has become something of a stylised fact in the economics 
profession. 
In this paper we propose to re-evaluate the inter-regime and the intra-regime exchange rate 
volatility issues in a number of ways, some of which are novel. On the theory side we expand the 
canonical monetary model of floating exchange rates to account for ‘missing variables’ in the 
case of regulated markets. Since, for example, the Bretton Woods regime was characterized by 
fixed exchange rates combined with trade and capital market distortions, an analysis of this 
regime has to take account of such distortions. 
A key novelty in our study lies in the examination of inter-regime volatility and, in particular, the 
behavior of an expanded set of fundamentals in the Bretton Woods and post-Bretton Woods 
periods. For these regimes we shift the conventional question from ‘why do we not observe 
enough exchange rate volatility in fixed rate regimes?’ to ‘which variables do absorb the 
fundamental volatility?’. We believe that asking the question in this way is insightful since there 
may be other fundamentals which exhibit variability in these regimes. If exchange rates are fixed, 
or managed, then it is variables like the interest differential, international reserves or IMF support 
which adjust rather than the exchange rate. Furthermore, in these regimes there are often other 
regulated aspects which should be incorporated into any empirical evaluation of the volatility of 
exchange rate fundamentals. Perhaps the most notable is the existence of capital controls in fixed 
rate regimes and, as we show, these can have important implications for appropriately gauging 
the effects of macro fundamentals. We demonstrate that the volatility in the fundamentals is at 
least partly absorbed by these missing variables. We find evidence for this result using case study 
evidence and further cross-country evidence. The apparent disparity across regimes is then partly 
resolved by the fact that one has to use different sets of fundamentals in computing cross-regime 
comparisons.  
                                                      
2Duarte (2003) examines the effects of the exchange rate regime in the context of a dynamic general 
equilibrium model with nominal goods prices set in the buyer’s currency and incomplete asset markets. Her 
model predicts a sharp increase in the volatility of the real exchange rate when moving from fixed to 
flexible exchange rates. This pattern is not observed for other variables. Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) argue 
that at least part of the inter-regime volatility puzzle may be explained by using an inappropriate 
classification of the exchange rate regime. In particular, they show that in moving from the IMF’s 
classification of an exchange rate regime (as used in the studies of Baxter and Stockman (1989) and Flood 
and Rose (1995, 1999)) to one based on the actuality of the regime, there was in fact much more flexibility 
of exchange rates during Bretton Woods and much more fixity during the post-Bretton Woods period. 
  3One particular problem in assessing the volatility of fundamentals in the Bretton Woods fixed 
exchange rate regime is the paucity of good quality data on, for example, capital controls. To gain 
insight into the importance of capital controls in affecting the exchange rate fundamentals 
relationship, we analyse data from the ERM experience with managed exchange rates. 
Additionally, we use data from the German and US experiences with monetary unions to show 
that fundamental volatility is reduced, compared to inter-country comparisons, when the 
exchange rate is permanently fixed, and this accords with the monetary model of the exchange 
rate. 
We re-examine the issue of intra-regime volatility by re-evaluating the relationship between the 
volatility of macroeconomic fundamentals and the exchange rate in two flexible exchange rate 
regimes, namely the inter-war experience and the post-Bretton Woods regime. In contrast to the 
perceived wisdom, we demonstrate that the volatility of exchange rates and fundamentals are 
quite tightly aligned in these regimes and there is no evidence of excess volatility.  
The outline of the remainder of this paper is as follows. In the next section we present an 
extension of a representative agent monetary model. This model is designed to motivate the kind 
of traditional fundamentals used in exchange rate studies. It has, however, the further purpose that 
it clearly shows how volatility of fundamentals may show up in what we call the wedge rather 
than in the exchange rate, as is usually assumed. In section 3 we empirically investigate the inter-
regime volatility. Subsequently, in section 4, we study intra-regime under different exchange rate 
regimes including pure floats and monetary unions. 
2. The monetary model with distortions 
2.1 The model  
We derive a variant of the monetary model in a two-country two-period endowment economy as 
presented in for example Stockman (1980) and Lucas (1982) to illustrate the relationship between 
fundamentals and the exchange rate. In contrast to these authors, we do not employ Clower’s 
cash-in-advance-constraint but include money in the utility function. Both approaches have 
materially the same economic implications, but we deemed the latter more expedient. For 
simplicity only a two-period economy is considered. The novelty in our presentation relates to the 
incorporation of distortions which drive a wedge between the exchange rate and the standard 
fundamentals. We show how these may pick up the volatility in the fundamentals. 
In the following foreign variables are superscripted by a star. There is uncertainty regarding the 
second period, and there are n different states of the world j. The variables subscripted by j thus 
refer to second period variables in state j. The domestic representative agent maximizes the 
following two-period time separable logarithmic expected utility function
3
                                                      
3Using a somewhat more general specification of power utility would not affect the derivation of the 
monetary model below, except for an extra constant. 
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The utility function comprises a per period consumption bundle X and real money balances 
* / M SP ω . The personal rate of time preference is the factor . β  The j-th future state of nature 
carries probability jj ,= 1 . π π ∑  To save on notation we immediately express the domestic deflator 
into the foreign deflator. Thus the domestic price deflator P of the nominal money balances M 
equals the price of the consumption bundle in foreign prices P
* times the trade distortionω and 
the exchange rate S, i.e.   The factor
*. PS P ω = ω signifies the tariff levies, export subsidies, 
transportation costs and the tariff equivalent of any quotas that drive a wedge between the foreign 
and domestic price levels. This wedge is responsable for the absence of absolute PPP, see 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000). 
The expected utility function is maximized subject to two budget constraints. The first period 
budget constraint reads 
   (2.2) 
* 0( ) SP X Y B SD M T ωτ =− + + + . +
Here Y is the agent’s endowment (production is exogenous), B are domestic bonds, D are foreign 
bonds,  M are money balances and T are net transfers to the government. Since output Y is 
exogenous, we only model net trade. We also do not explicitly model the demand for government 
services (these could be subsumed additively into the utility function). The government services 
are financed out of the lump sum tax, T, and changes in the money supply. The transfer T may 
also comprise balance of payments support received from (subsidy given to) the other country via 
the IMF. Government accounting also comprises the revenues from tariff levies and capital 
controls. Domestic bonds trade at unit price and yield a gross return of R. Foreign bonds also 
trade at unit price abroad yielding I, but there may be a (non-unitary) capital controlτ which 
distorts the trade in foreign securities (this is interpreted as the tariff equivalent of capital 
controls). The second period budget constraint in state j is 
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The left hand side records total returns from the first period investments in assets, while the right 
hand side gives net expenditures and money balances held for transaction purposes. 
Maximization entails solving the Lagrangian problem 
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The first order conditions (assuming non-corner solutions and sufficiency) with respect to X, M, 
Xj, Mj, B, D, are respectively  
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and the two budget constraints (2.2) and (2.3). Substituting (2.5) and (2.7) into (2.9) gives the 
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The monetary pricing kernels derive from combining (2.6) and (2.8) with (2.9) 
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similarly using (2.6) and (2.8) and (2.10) gives 
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These kernels can be solved further by using the general equilibrium market clearing conditions 
and the budget constraints of individuals and the governments. 
Apart from these pricing kernels we can directly obtain a semi-reduced form quantity equation as 






λ =− (2.15) 
In combination with (2.5) this yields 
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R
γω −=  (2.16) 
The velocity term, 1-1/R, increases with R, and, when multiplied by money balances,  equals 
nominal consumption expenditures scaled by the weight of money in the utility function. Note 
that the expenditures include the trade distortion. 
In the foreign country the representative agent is assumed to solve a similar problem. The utility 
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The Lagrangian reads 
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2.2 Exchange rate implications 





































The logarithmic form of (2.25) reads (using lower case letters to denote logarithmically 
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Using shorthand notation, we write this equation in relative differences as  
  . smxrω = −+−   (2.27) 
Without the trade distortions measure,ω  , we would have a standard monetary approach exchange 
rate equation. Except that we obtain a somewhat different expression for the interest differential 









>  (2.28) 
so that an increase in the domestic interest rate depreciates the currency. Another minor 
difference is that we have expenditure, x, rather than income as the scale variable in the exchange 
rate equation. The specification (2.27) without the trade distortion also matches the specification 
of the macro-economic fundamentals as in Flood and Rose (1999, p. 663). Omitting r ω −   from 
(2.27) gives the so-called traditional fundamental from Flood and Rose (1995). 
Note the trade distortion measure in (2.27) enters with a negative sign, as in the case of the 
expenditure measure . x   In principle, if these distortions are adjusted in the right way, they can 




* ω are chosen correctly? If these terms represent tariffs and subsidies, such a task might 
be impossible. If, however, they are taken to represent the implicit price distortions induced by a 
quota, then the case for variable adjustment in the distortions compensating such that the spot rate 
is constant appears reasonable. 
Substituting the monetary pricing kernels (2.14) and (2.22) into (2.25) yields a relation between 






















Absent foreign exchange market intervention, the capital account is the mirror image of the trade 
account, and henceω and
* ω should be related to τ and
* τ . The relationship is slightly more 
  8complicated due to the fact that capital account variables not only relate to current variables, but 
also to future variables. This is signified by the last factor in the expression which also contains 
future capital market distortions. 
Another useful linkage to the extant literature can be made if we assume that the forcing variables 
















































The current exchange rate is now written in terms of expected future fundamentals. Adding the 
assumption that the future money stocks, the expenditures and distortions are jointly lognormally 
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The interesting aspect of this specification is that it comprises both capital market and trade 
distortions. In sum, we have several variants of the monetary model including distortions. In the 
absence of distortions, the specifications reduce to the standard monetary models from the 
literature. 
To make a link to the empirical sections, consider again (2.27). Compute the variance on both 
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 (2.34) 
Without variability in the distortions, i.e under a free float, the volatility reduces to 































,, 222 mx , r ω ωωω σ σσσ −+−      can compensate for the volatility in the fundamentals, 
effectively driving the exchange rate variability 
2
s σ  to zero. Under a dirty float, all terms in (2.34) 
will in general be non-zero. The next sections try to identify the missing variances and 
covariances. 
3. Inter-regime volatility  
In this section we combine data from the Bretton Woods and post-Bretton Woods periods to 
address the issue of the importance of the wedge in explaining why traditional monetary 
fundamentals may not be enough to explain inter-regime volatility. Representative candidates for 
the wedges as in (2.27) and (2.32) for the Bretton Woods period are official reserves, IMF 
support and capital controls. We start by examining the role of IMF support in surpressing 
exchange rate variability during the Bretton Woods period. We then go on to combine  IMF 
support with traditional fundamentals, like money and income, to address the volatility issue. The 
volatility comparisons will be done using both annual and monthly datasets. Both datasets span 
the Bretton Woods and post-Bretton Woods periods and for European currencies include the 
period in which the ERM operated. This variation in regimes within the dataset follows Flood and 
Rose (1995) and is essential for an empirical investigation of inter-regime volatility. Throughout 
the empirical analysis, two countries will be used as numeraire: the United States (1) and 
Germany (2). Although the US was clearly the dominant numeraire currency in the Bretton 
Woods period, Germany’s importance increased in the post-Bretton Woods period, particularly 
after the formation of the ERM. Finally, a case study of the UK illustrates the role of capital 
controls and the IMF support in breaking the link between the exchange rate and fundamental 
volatility. 
3.1 Reserves, IMF support and exchange rate volatility 
In this section we look more closely at the role of reserves and IMF support in explaining the 
volatility disconnect in fixed exchange rate periods. We look first at the appropriate way to 
measure reserves and then go on to illustrate the quantitative importance of IMF support. 
To the extent that central banks use foreign exchange reserves to stabilize the exchange rate, a 
tradeoff between exchange rate and reserve volatility would be expected. According to the 
monetary approach to the balance of payments, a divergence in the fundamentals (e.g. high 
domestic money growth) must be dissipated through a loss of reserves or the peg will have to be 
  10abandoned. Note, however, that we do not expect such a trade-off when the fundamentals do not 
diverge. 
There appears to be little in the way of empirical evidence supporting a trade-off between 
exchange rate and reserve volatility. Intuitively, the abandonment of a peg would be expected to 
lead to a reduction in reserve holdings and their volatility. However, Flood and Rose (1995) find 
that the volatility of reserves is generally higher following the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
system. We offer an explanation for this apparent absence of a tradeoff. A key reason why there 
may not be a stronger trade-off between reserves and exchange rate volatility is because IMF 
credit facilities can distort the relationship. In this section we argue that any analysis of the trade-
off between exchange rate and reserve volatility needs to take into account the role of IMF credit 
in supporting weak currencies. 
In Table 1 we illustrate the issue for the UK, a key participant in the Bretton Woods regime. 
Table 1 contains annual data for the UK from 1960 to 1969, a turbulent period in UK monetary 
history. Column 1 gives the IMF quota. We note that when Fund holdings of sterling (column 4) 
are below the quota, the UK's reserve position in the IMF (column 3) is positive and equals the 
difference between the two series; otherwise the reserve position equals zero. Each time the UK 
drew upon the IMF, the IMF's total holdings of sterling increased, leading to a reduction in the 
UK’s reserve position at the Fund. When the reserve position reached zero, fund credit (column 
2) allowed further drawings to levels above the quota. Non-gold reserves (column 6) equal the 
foreign exchange reserves (column 5) plus the UK’s reserve position in the fund (column 3). In 
times of crisis, such as in 1961 and from 1964 onwards, the UK borrowed money from the IMF to 
replenish its foreign reserves. During 1965-1966 the extensive use of Fund credit may have 
postponed sterling's devaluation to November 1967. This is not at all clear from the data on 
foreign exchange reserves or non-gold reserves. These are low in 1964, but not thereafter since 
these data do not discriminate between reserve increases resulting from improvements in the 
balance-of-payments or from Fund borrowings! Hence, it would seem that the existence of IMF 
credit distorts reserve data. This cautions against using the standard reserve data in a volatility 
calculation and suggests that accounting for IMF support will give a better picture of the volatility 
trade-off. 
We therefore look at whether IMF support is quantitatively important enough to include in an 
analysis of the volatility tradeoff. Table 1 shows that during the 1960s, Fund holdings of sterling 
were large compared to foreign exchange or non-gold reserves. Additionally, Table 2 shows the 
IMF's holdings of currency as a percentage of non-gold reserves for all countries during three 
subperiods. In general this percentage is highest during the Bretton Woods years and in the 
1970s. With a few exceptions the percentage has declined from the 1980s onwards.
4  
In the remainder of our analysis of inter-regime volatility we look at the IMF holdings of a 
currency as a percentage of its IMF quota, to correct for the effect of quota increases. In their 
analyses of the volatility trade-off, Flood and Rose (1995) examined if the existence of non-gold 
                                                      
4 In Table 2, the high percentage for France during the first sub-period can be partly explained by the fact 
that France had chosen to hold most of its reserves in gold instead of in foreign currency.  
  11reserves was an important source of fundamental volatility. They concluded it was not, but our 
discussion here suggests that it is not sufficient to rely on non-gold reserves, rather fund credit or 
fund holdings of currency should be taken into consideration. We thus opt for fund holdings of 
currency as a percentage of fund quota and refer to this as our IMF variable. 
Figure 1 contains scatter plots of the change in the exchange rate (against the dollar, in dlog) 
versus, respectively, the change in our IMF variable (in dlog) in the top plot and the change in 
non-gold reserves (in dlog) in the bottom plot. The data are monthly and combine the experiences 
of 21 countries over the period 1960 to 19998 (see the data appendix for a list of countries). The 
scatter-plot for the IMF variable is shaped in the form of a cross, implying a highly non-linear 
dependence between changes in the exchange rate and the IMF measure. There thus exists a 
volatility tradeoff, though not a linear one. Either exchange rates or the Fund holdings of a 
currency are adjusting, but hardly ever are the two mechanisms for adjustment combined. In 
comparison, the scatterplot for non-gold reserves has much less observations along the axes, 
suggesting the absence of a similar non-linear tradeoff between changes in the exchange rate and 
non-gold reserves. Here the two adjustment mechanisms are repeatedly used in tandem, or even 
occur in such a way that one partly compensates the other. 
Based on the UK experience during the 1960s, the magnitude of IMF support (especially in the 
Bretton Woods period) and the cross-shaped pattern in the top plot of Figure 1, we have chosen 
the IMF variable as our candidate measure of the wedge. In the next two sections, we combine 
the IMF variable with traditional fundamentals to estimate (2.34). 
3.2 Volatility comparisons: annual data 
As an initial pass at the issue of inter-regime volatility we present in Table 3 the variances of two 
traditional macroeconomic fundamentals, namely the annual inflation and income growth 
differentials, along with the change in the exchange rate and the change in our IMF support 
variable across 19 countries (see Table A1 in the data appendix for a listing of countries). The use 
of annual data has the advantage of reducing short-term noise in the macroeconomic data while 
preserving the main stylised facts. As this comes at the cost of a reduction in the number of 
observations, an analysis of monthly data is added in the next subsection. In the empirical 
analysis we use income growth instead of consumption growth. We have also chosen inflation 
instead of money supply growth as our monetary fundamental because of the limited availability 
of money growth data for several countries in the 1960s. This is an important consideration in 
view of the small sample size of our annual analysis. We will redress this in the monthly analysis 
below, which includes money growth. The variances in Table 3 have the US and Germany as 
their numeraire countries and are calculated for three subperiods of comparable length (a Bretton 
Woods period, from 1961 to 1971, and two post Bretton Woods periods, respectively from 1972 
to 1983 and from 1984 to 1998).  
The first point to note from these results is that they confirm the point made by a number of other 
researchers, that in moving from Bretton Woods to the post-Bretton Woods period the volatility 
of standard fundamentals is very similar but the volatility of the exchange rate changes 
substantially. Note, however, that in the floating periods exchange rate volatility vis-à-vis the 
  12dollar is almost twice the volatility vis-à-vis the DM. This suggests that the volatility issue might 
be at least partly a dollar issue. We will return to this theme below. The results in Table 3 also 
indicate that there is a lot of volatility stemming from the IMF variable in the Bretton Woods 
period and, interestingly, that the average volatility of this variable decreases as we move into the 
first post-Bretton Woods period and decreases substantially in the period when capital controls 
were finally relaxed (1984-1998). There thus appears to be a clear trade-off between  s ∆ volatility 
and  volatility as one moves between regimes.   IMF ∆
To explicate the inter-regime volatility we run regressions of exchange rate volatility on 
fundamental volatility as specified in equation (2.34). As we noted, under a fixed regime (2.34) 
collapses to (2.36), while in a undistorted free float (2.34) reduces to (2.35). If one has only data 
from these two pure regimes, a regression of 
2
s σ  on fundamentals 
2
m σ   , 
2
x σ  , 
2
r σ   and the wedge 
2
ω σ  , gives a negative coefficient on the latter variable. The intuition for this is in Figure 1. Since 
under a pure float 
2
s σ =0 and in a undistorted free float 
2
ω σ  =0, the variances in both cases lie on a 
hyperplane of a dimension lower than if all variances are non-zero. One can show that this 
implies a negative sign on the 
2
ω σ   variable in a regression of exchange rate volatility on the 
volatilities of the fundamentals and the wedge.
5 Since a fair number of observations comes from 
the dirty float period in the 1970s and we have ommitted variables, we do not expect a perfect 
correspondence between the theoretical specification in (2.34) and the empirical results.  
In Table 4 we estimate equation (2.34) using the annual dataset by means of generalized least 
squares on the panel of 19 countries and for the 3 subperiods identified above. This yields a total 
of 57 observations. For both numeraire currencies, we report three different specifications, which 
differ depending on the inclusion of covariance terms and the IMF variable. Interest rates have 
been omitted from the regressions due to lack of data. Below, we will include interest rates in a 
smaller sample of monthly data. Table 4 yields some interesting observations. First, the 
explanatory power of the DM regressions is high compared to the results for the dollar. Whereas 
fundamentals explain over 50% of the variance of the exchange rate vis-à-vis the German 
currency, the explanatory power versus the dollar stays around 25%. The second observation 
relates to the sign and significance of the traditional fundamentals. For the German numeraire, the 
variances of inflation and income growth are positively and significantly related to the variance of 
the exchange rate, as one would expect from the monetary model. Together these two variances 
can explain 56% of the variance in the DM exchange rate. Inflation and income growth do much 
worse in the dollar regressions, where the variance of inflation is barely significant and the 
variance of income has the wrong sign.  
Turning to the variance and covariances involving the IMF variable, we observe that these are 
highly significant in the dollar regressions, but less so in the DM regressions. In all specifications, 
the variance of the IMF variable has a negative sign, as explained above. This corresponds to the 
visual impression from Figure 1, which illustrated the negative cross-shaped dependence between 
                                                      
5 In regression terms, this is due to zeros in the X-matrix with the explanatory variables and in the y-vector 
with the dependent variable in particular places. 
  13the exchange rate and IMF support, and also makes intuitive sense, as fluctuations in IMF support 
might serve to stabilize the currency.  
According to (2.34), volatility in IMF support should increase exchange rate volatility, ceteris 
paribus the volatility in other fundamental variables. It is only by covarying with the traditional 
fundamentals that IMF support should result in lower exchange rate volatility. A good example of 
how this works is the negative and significant coefficient ofcovar( , ) p IMF ∆ ∆  in the dollar 
specification, which can be interpreted quite easily: inflationary policies in the Bretton Woods 
period could be sustained longer without the need for an exchange rate adjustment when IMF 
support was made available. A positive covariance between  p ∆  and  IMF ∆ thus reducesvar( ). s ∆  
The negative sign of the coefficient ofvar( ) IMF ∆ has been explained in regression terms above. 
In addition, inflation and income may inadequately capture fundamental volatility. The 
significant negative sign for  may then pick up the covariances between IMF support 
and other missing fundamental variables. Candidates for such missing variables are, for example, 
fiscal policy variables and the current account. 
var( ) IMF ∆
Summarizing our annual results, we conclude that the extent to which the volatility issue is a 
puzzle seems to depend on the choice of numeraire. The traditional fundamentals do well in the 
DM regressions, but badly in the dollar regressions. In addition, our IMF variable adds 
explanatory power to both the dollar and DM regressions. We will now investigate whether these 
results are upheld using a monthly dataset.  
3.3 Volatility comparisons: monthly data 
We use monthly data to derive annual standard deviations (based on 12 non-overlapping monthly 
observations) as our volatility measures. These are calculated only for complete years (i.e. years 
for which we have 12 monthly observations). In principle, this yields 39 (years) times 21 
(countries) = 819 observations, but in practice limited data availability reduced this number, see 
the bottom line of Table 5. For all variables, except IMF support, we take the first differences of 
the logs relative to the numeraire. See the data appendix for full details. 
Table 5 reports regression results for a large sample including all countries except Switzerland 
(for which the IMF measure was unavailable for most of the sample period). Due to the limited 
data availability for many countries, this regression again excludes interest rate volatility, but we 
can now use money growth instead of inflation. Table 5 shows that the variance of money growth 
is significantly related to exchange rate volatility in all specifications. Income volatility is 
unrelated to exchange rate volatility in all regressions. Similar to the annual results, the  volatility 
connection holds better versus Germany than versus the US, both in terms of significance and 
explanatory power. For both numeraires, the coefficient of cov( m ∆  , IMF ∆ ) is significantly 
negative, implying that IMF support can reduce or postpone the spill-over of a relatively high 
money growth into exchange rate volatility. This result resembles the significance of 
cov( p ∆ , ) in the annual dollar regressions. It supports our interpretation of IMF support as 
driving a wedge between the volatility in traditional fundamentals and exchange rate volatility. In 
addition to the covariance term, 
IMF ∆
var( ) IMF ∆  is significantly negative in the DM regressions. This 
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sign of the coefficient of  ).  var( ) IMF ∆
In order to ensure that our regression results do not depend on the inclusion of small high-
inflation countries, Table 6 reports the results of a balanced panel regression for six large 
industrialized countries (Canada, France, Italy, Australia, the UK and either the US or Germany). 
Note that the number of observations is much lower than in the full monthly dataset. This set of 
results shows the starkest contrast between the two numeraires. While the dollar regressions fail, 
overall, to establish a link between fundamental volatility and exchange rate volatility (except for 
the covariance term between money and income growth), the DM regressions are much stronger. 
All variances except var( ) are significantly related to var( y ∆ s ∆ ), including the variance of the 
long-term interest rate  In addition, three out of six covariance terms are significant at 
at least a 10% level. Given the self-imposed constraint of a cross-section limited to just six 
countries, this is a strong result. 
(var( )). il ∆
We conclude that the monthly data confirm the annual results. The fundamental connection is 
strongest in regressions which take the DM as the numeraire currency. In the majority of the 
regressions, there also appears to be a role for IMF support in explaining the wedge between 
fundamental and exchange rate volatility. Having said that, the explanation of currency volatility 
vis-à-vis the dollar remains a challenge. 
3.4 A case study of inter-regime volatility 
In this subsection we investigate the volatility disconnect puzzle in more detail for one country, 
namely the United Kingdom. We use monthly data over the period 1960-1998 and take Germany 
as the numeraire country. One of the key reasons for focusing on this country is that we have 
access to good quality data on the onshore-offshore differential for the Bretton Woods and the 
post Bretton Woods period, and can therefore make an inter-regime comparison of volatility 
using this wedge variable. Figure 2 combines four time-series graphs which, in our view, 
together, present a coherent picture of the connection between exchange rate and fundamental 
volatility for the United Kingdom. The graphs plot absolute percentage changes in the pound/DM 
rate, absolute changes in the off-shore/on-shore interest rate differential (annualized yields), 
designed to get at the issue of the importance of capital controls, absolute money growth 
differentials versus Germany and absolute percentage changes in IMF holdings of sterling. 
Three subperiods can be distinguished here. In the first, during the 1960s, the fixed peg prevented 
fundamental volatility from spilling over into immediate exchange rate volatility, although the 
pound sterling devalued twice during this period. The second period is the 1970s, where the 
exchange rate becomes flexible and money growth volatility increases strongly. In this period, a 
strong divergence between the fundamentals of the UK and Germany leads to both a high level of 
exchange rate volatility and volatility in the capital control and IMF support terms. We 
hypothesize that absent capital controls and IMF support, exchange rate volatility would have 
been even higher in this period. In the third period, starting at the beginning of the 1980s, capital 
controls and IMF support lose their role in UK policy and we start to see a straightforward 
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capital controls. It is striking how marked the difference is between the first and third subperiods. 
The volatility of the onshore/offshore differential is almost the reverse of the stylised exchange 
rate volatility - highly volatile in Bretton Woods and hardly any volatility in the last floating rate 
period. This would seem to underscore the predictions of our model that previous discussions of 
the volatility trade off have missed a key variable for the Bretton Woods period. Note also that 
the volatility of IMF support is also important for the Bretton Woods period but almost non-
existent in the last floating rate period.  
4. Intra-regime volatility  
The second part of our empirical investigation looks at the issue of intra-regime volatility. We 
focus first on two flexible exchange rate regimes, the inter-war experience and the post-Bretton 
Woods regime. We then go on to examine the the ERM experience of target zones with 
adjustable exchange rates, which highlights the important role that capital controls can have in 
driving a wedge between exchange rate volatility and fundamental volatility. Finally, we examine 
how fundamentals behave in two monetary unions: the EMU and the US. 
4.1 The interbellum experiences and the post-Bretton Woods period 
In this subsection we re-examine whether exchange rates are excessively volatile in two flexible 
foreign exchange regimes, namely the inter-war floating exchange rate experience and the post-
Bretton Woods period. We show that there is quite a close correspondence between exchange rate 
volatility and fundamental volatility. The issue of intra-regime volatility is perhaps not quite as 
contentious as that of inter-regime volatility. This is illustrated in the work of Flood and Rose 
(1995) who demonstrated for the post-Bretton Woods period that there is quite a tight link 
between the volatility of so-called virtual (that is the log of the exchange rate minus the interest 
differential scaled by the interest rate semi-elasticity of the demand for money) and traditional 
fundamentals (the sum of the log differentials of money and income). Indeed, the two series 
appear to be indistinguishable. 
Our own data sets essentially confirm the findings of Flood and Rose. Consider, first, our base 
line monetary model, the version of the model without the wedge generated by the distortions. 
The inter-war results are presented in Table 7. Due to German hyperinflation the choice of 
numeraire has been confined to the US. Because of data limitations income volatility is not 
included in Table 7. Nonetheless, even without income volatility, it is clear that money growth 
volatility closely mirrors exchange rate volatility. In some cases where exchange rate volatility is 
substantially higher than money growth volatility (e.g. Belgium, Finland and France), the mean 
money growth differential is high, indicating monetary divergence between these countries and 
the US. In the bottom rows of Table 7 we report rank correlations which have been calculated to 
account for the extreme observations due to the hyperinflations in Austria and Germany. These 
show a significant link between the standard deviations of the exchange rate and money growth 
and between mean money growth and exchange rate volatility. 
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deviations of log differences of the exchange rate and fundamentals, with both the US and 
Germany as alternate numeraires. We note, first, the strikingly close correspondence between the 
average fundamental volatility and the volatility of the exchange rate, reported in the final row of 
the table. The close correspondence between exchange rate and fundamental volatility is also 
evident on a country-by-country comparison. It is noteworthy that with the US as numeraire in 9 
cases exchange volatility (just) dominates fundamental volatility, while in 7 cases the opposite is 
actually true. With Germany as the numeraire currency, the score runs in the opposite direction - 
11 versus 10. In sum, Table 8 shows the quite striking result that the order of magnitude of 
volatility in total fundamentals from the base-line monetary model (m-y) is not very different 
from that in changes of the exchange rate. Although the order of magnitudes of the standard 
deviations reported in Table 8 are similar, the correlation between fundamental volatility and 
exchange rate volatility across countries turned out to be insignificant (these are not reported). 
We conclude that researchers who have inferred that exchange rates are excessively volatile in 
these regimes may have misinterpreted the data. 
4.2 Target zones 
In this section we examine the volatility of fundamentals and exchange rates during the Exchange 
Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System. Evidence from the ERM highlights 
the role of capital controls acting as a wedge to disconnect exchange rate volatility and 
fundamental volatility in the short term (see also Gros and Thygesen, 1998). Evidence from the 
monetary unions in the US and Germany serves to show that fundamentals are closely aligned 
when the exchange rate is never allowed to vary. 
Table 9 presents data on exchange rate and fundamental volatility for France, Italy and the 
Netherlands during three subperiods of the ERM: the turbulent starting period from 1979 to 
March 1983, the period of tranquility in the EMS from April 1983 to the 1992 crisis and, finally, 
the period from the EMS crisis to the start of EMU. The classification into these three subperiods 
follows Gros and Thygesen (1998). For each country we provide standard deviations of the 
exchange rate with realignments (∆s) and without such realignments (∆s excl. realignments), 
along with the standard deviations of the composite fundamental term and the offshore/onshore 
interest differential. There are a number of observations that we draw from this table. 
First, the magnitude of exchange rate volatility is clearly dependent on whether realignments are 
excluded or not. With realignments included, exchange rate volatility is much greater compared 
to the nonrealignment position. It is noteworthy that in their calculation of Virtual Fundamentals 
Flood and Rose (1995) do not include exchange rate realignments for the Bretton Woods period 
and this must bias their findings in favor of the volatility of fundamentals dominating the 
volatility of the exchange rate. 
The second point we note from Table 9 is that for France and Italy, mean growth rates in 
fundamentals versus Germany deviated strongly in the first subperiod (µ equals respectively 0.47 
and 0.89) compared to the other two subperiods ((µ<0.25 in all cases) , while the standard 
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more related to the unrest in the ERM than the differences in the standard deviations. For the 
Netherlands, the mean growth in fundamentals is very similar to Germany across the three 
periods and there is corresponding lower volatility in the exchange rate and the off-shore/on-
shore interest rate differential in the three periods. We believe this observation makes economic 
sense: when fundamentals between countries are on stable but diverging paths, currency markets 
will react to this. 
The third interesting aspect of Table 9 is that volatility in the change in the off-shore/on-shore 
interest rate differential is important for France and Italy during the subperiod when capital 
controls were in force (i.e. 79.01-83.03). The standard deviations of the interest rate differential 
equaled 0.31 and 0.30 for France and Italy, respectively, before dropping to levels below 0.10 in 
the final two subperiods. Clearly, the existence of capital controls for prolonged periods, such as 
during the Bretton Woods regime, could explain the disconnect between the volatility of 
fundamentals and exchange rates. Since the Netherlands was, in general, pursing monetary 
policies which were consistent with the Bundesbank during much of the ERM experience capital 
controls were less important, as the final row in Table 9 illustrates. 
4.3 Monetary unions 
We now finally discuss data on fundamental volatility in regions where the exchange rate is not 
allowed to adjust. According to the monetary model discussed in section 2, we would expect 
fundamental volatility to be much lower between these regions compared to fundamental 
volatility between regions with separate currencies. This is not only because the exchange rate 
can no longer provide adjustment (either continuously in a float or periodically in a fixed but 
adjustable exchange rate regime), but also because our wedge variables typically do not play a 
role within monetary unions. 
Table 10 combines data on 10 European countries and 9 German provinces for the period 1990-
1998. The largest German province - Nordrhein Westfalen - is used as the numeraire. In this way 
we can compare the experience within the monetary union with the experiences outside Germany. 
The lower part of Table 10 shows that even within Germany, some fundamental volatility exists, 
though the order of magnitude is smaller than the fundamental volatility that exists between the 
European countries. Especially the volatility in the inflation differential is much lower for the 
German provinces than for the European countries. Exchange rate volatility for the European 
countries appears to be highest when there is either real divergence (i.e. for Ireland and Finland) 
or monetary divergence (i.e. Greece). The correlation coefficients at the bottom of Table 10 show 
that there is a statistically significant relationship between the standard deviation of  s ∆  and the 
standard deviations of  p ∆ ,  and m ∆  y ∆ . 
We finally consider data from the US monetary union. Figures 3 and 4 show the synchronous 
movement in fundamentals - demand deposits and income - in the US monetary union during the 
long period from 1929 to 1983. The deviation of demand deposit growth in New York from the 
national pattern - especially during the 1940s - can be attributed to New York’s role as a financial 
center. Apart from the demand deposits in New York, the cross-state correlations between 
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expect in a monetary union. We conclude that the data for monetary union fit the monetary model 
very well: when the exchange rate is not allowed to adjust, fundamental volatility will need to 
adjust downwards. This is an obvious potential future test for the performance of EMU. 
Atpresent, the short period since the introduction of the euro makes it hard to empirically assess 
whether a divergence of  fundamentals will lead to a collapse of the union or whether the 
fundamentals are indeed slowly converging.  
5. Conclusions  
There exists a widely held notion that freely floating exchange rates are excessively volatile when 
judged against traditional macroeconomic fundamentals and when moving from fixed to floating 
exchange rates. In this paper we have reexamined the issues of inter- and intra-regime volatility 
using a number of different data sets. In terms of the issue of inter-regime volatility, we have 
confirmed the findings of a number of other researchers that in moving from fixed to floating 
exchange rates the variability of the standard macroeconomic fundamentals stays roughly 
unchanged, but what does change is the volatility of the exchange rate (both real and nominal). 
However, in contrast to other studies we have demonstrated both theoretically and empirically 
that there may be other factors, reflected in what we call the wedge, that help to explain why 
fundamentals are not sufficiently volatile in fixed exchange rate regimes. In particular, we have 
shown that capital controls and a country’s position at the IMF are important sources of volatility, 
or suppressed volatility. In sum, we argue, and indeed demonstrate, that in cross-regime 
comparisons one has to account for the missing variables which compensate for the fundamental 
variables volatility under fixed rates. Moreover, we find that the volatility issue may be partly a 
dollar issue, as the link between fundamental volatility and exchange rate volatility improves 
markedly if we switch the numeraire from the dollar to the DM.  
Our analysis of intra-regime volatility shows, inter alia, that it is important to include exchange 
rate realignments in any calculation of exchange rate volatility in fixed exchange rate regimes; 
this point seems to have been ignored in previous empirical studies. We also demonstrate that in 
flexible exchange rate regimes there is actually quite a close link between exchange rate volatility 
and fundamental volatility using standard macroeconomic variables. It would seem therefore that 
what many regard as a stylised fact of floating rate regimes - that exchange rates are excessively 
volatile - is something of a mirage. 
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  20Data appendix 
Bretton Woods, Post-Bretton Woods and ERM 
The annual macro-economic data used in section 3.2 have been taken from the European 
Commission AMECO database, except the data on IMF support, which have been derived using 
data from the IFS cd-rom (see below). The following countries are included: Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and the USA. 
The monthly macro-economic data have been taken from the IFS cd-rom. The data are monthly 
and start in January 1960. Due to the introduction of the euro in January 1999, the sample period 
ends in December 1998. The following countries are included: Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, South-Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the USA. Our 
exchange rate measure is the bilateral period-average price of the US\ dollar (IFS line rf). We 
choose M1 (IFS line 34 or national definition) as our monetary aggregate. Where M1 was not 
available, we have chosen either a narrower (currency, IFS line 34A) or a broader aggregate (IFS 
line 35M or the national definition). To control for seasonality, we filter the money series by 
applying a one-sided moving average of the current observation and 12-lagged values (cf. Mark 
and Sul, 2001). The seasonally adjusted industrial production index (IFS line 66) is used for 
output; the CPI (IFS line 64) for prices. We use both long-term (IFS line 61) and short-term 
interest rates (IFS lines 60b/60c). Off-shore interest rates are available for a only few countries. 
Regarding reserves, we use non-gold reserves (IFS line 1L) and Fund holdings of domestic 
currency as a percentage of quota (IFS line 2F). The latter measure - denoted IMF - indicates the 
extent to which a country draws upon the IMF. Data on the exchange rate and non-gold reserves 
are available for all countries over the complete sample period. The same applies to the IMF 
measure, with the exception of Portugal (1962:7-1998:12) and Switzerland (1992:2-1998:12). 
The availability of other series is indicated in Table A1. All data have been checked and corrected 
for errors. With the exception of interest rates, the data are transformed by natural logarithms. 
Interest rates are measured as nominal rates divided by 1200. 
Interbellum 
Data on exchange rates and money supplies are from the Bulletin Mesnuel de Statistique of the 
League of Nations.We are grateful to Martijn van Harten for collecting these data. 
EMU countries and German provinces 
Our exchange rate measure is the bilateral period-average price of the D-Mark, calculated from 
US dollar exchange rates (IFS line rf). Income and price are measured by respectively real GDP 
and the GDP deflator, available from the IFS (EMU countries) and the statistical office of the 
state of Baden-Württemberg (German provinces).We have chosen a broad monetary aggregate 
(M3/M2). For the EMU countries, data were available from Eurostat. Information on the regional 
distribution of currency within Germany is not available. Following Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin 
(1992), we proceeded using deposit data. For the German provinces, we use total deposits as our 
  21monetary aggregate. This aggregate includes sight deposits (''Sichteinlagen''), savings deposits 
(''Spareinlagen''), time deposits (''Termingelder'') and the socalled ''Sparbriefe'', and corresponds 
closest to the M3 monetary aggregate. We are grateful to Dr. H. Herrmann from the Bundesbank 
for providing these data. 
US regions 
Data on demand deposits and real income for nine US regions (New England, Mideast, excluding 
New York, New York, Great Lakes, Plains, Rocky Mountains, Southeast, Southwest, Farwest) 
were kindly provided by Peter Ireland. 
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Table 1: IMF Support for the United Kingdom during the 1960s 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 










1960 1950  0.0 487.5 1462.5 430.5  918.0
1961 1950  558.5 0.0 2508.5 1051.3  1051.3
1962 1950  0.0 502.4 1447.6 224.7  727.1
1963 1950  0.0 489.5 1460.6 173.9  663.4
1964 1950  515.9 0.0 2465.9 178.2  178.2
1965 1950  1906.7 0.0 3856.7 739.4  739.4
1966 2440  1864.9 0.0 4304.9 1157.7  1157.7
1967 2440  1013.4 0.0 3453.4 1405.0  1405.0
1968 2440  2275.3 0.0 4715.3 948.8  948.8
1969 2440  2241.1 0.0 4681.1 1055.1  1055.1
In millions of SDR, source IFS 
 
Table 2: IMF currency holdings as % of non-gold reserves 
  1960-1971 1972-1983 1984-1998 
Australia 25 34 20
Austria 7 6 7
Belgium 33 11 25
Canada 26 37 44
Denmark 41 19 9
Finland 35 43 12
France 143 17 20
G e r m a n y  827
Greece 35 31 15
Ireland 11 7 7
Italy 12 54 9
Japan 19 5 5
Netherlands 36 9 13
N o r w a y  2 183
Portugal 12 75 30
Spain 38 12 4
Sweden 21 14 11
United Kingdom  337 46 24
United States  211 116 33
 
Average 59 26 15
Source:  IFS    
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Table 3: Volatility comparisons: average variances for 19 countries 
based on annual data 
  1961-1971 1972-1983 1984-1998 
$  numeraire     
var( p ∆ )  4.6 10.6 5.9
var( )  y ∆ 8.5 8.4 4.7
var( s ∆ )  8.1 111.7 117.6
var( ) (/100)  IMF ∆ 36.8 19.9 2.5
 
DM numeraire 
var( p ∆ )  5.2 11.5 8.0
var( )  y ∆ 6.3 5.4 6.4
var( s ∆ )  11.7 56.0 59.3
var( ) (/100)  IMF ∆ 32.8 15.3 2.5
Data source: European Commision and IFS 
 
Table 4: Panel regressions: annual data 
  var( s ∆ ) 
  vs $  vs $  vs $  vs DM  vs DM  vs DM 
            
constant 69.78  85.66  71.38  6.76  13.59  9.53 
 (2.86)  (3.79)  (2.49)  (1.20)  (3.09)  (2.31) 






 (1.79)  (1.44)  (1.87)  (9.40)  (14.08)  (7.31) 







 (3.26)  (2.69)  (2.42)  (3.28)  (5.97)
  (1.67) 




   (3.85)  (4.30)    (4.73)  (1.25) 
covar( p ∆ , )  y ∆    7.01
**    2.85
**
     (2.85)      (4.22) 
covar( p ∆ , )  IMF ∆    -0.42
**    -0.036 
     (12.24)      (0.24) 
covar( , )  y ∆ IMF ∆    -0.08     -0.031 
     (0.45)      (0.35) 
            
# observations  57  57  57  57  57  57 
weighted adj. R
2 0.24 0.24 0.27 0.56 0.65 0.61 
GLS estimation with cross-section weights, t-stats in parentheses are calculated 
using white cross-section standard errors. Balanced panel of 19 countries; 
variances and covariances calculated using annual data for three subperiods 
(1961-1971; 1972-1983; 1984-1998); 
* and 
** indicate significance at respectively 
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Table 5: Panel regressions: monthly data, full sample 
  vs $  vs $  vs $  vs DM  vs DM  vs DM 
            
constant  0.0004 0.0004 0.0004  0.0005  0.0005 0.0005 
 (7.64)  (7.83)  (7.61)  (7.98)  (8.30)  (7.94) 







 (2.41)  (2.38)  (2.50)  (3.81)  (3.67)  (3.75) 
var( )  y ∆ -0.005 -0.003 0.002  0.013  0.016  0.022 
 (0.78)  (0.40)  (0.29)  (0.68)  (0.95)  (1.21) 
var( )  IMF ∆  -0.0007  -0.0007   -0.002
** -0.001
**
   (0.83)  (1.03)    (3.37)  (2.00) 
covar( , )  m ∆  y ∆    -0.078      0.886 
     (0.07)      (0.62) 
covar( , )  m ∆  IMF ∆    -0.976
**    -1.653
**
     (2.45)      (4.15) 
covar( , )  y ∆ IMF ∆    -0.02      -0.016 
     (1.58)      (0.76) 
            
# observations  680  680  680  672  672  672 
weighted adj. R
2 -0.013 -0.018 -0.010  0.09  0.11  0.12 
GLS estimation with cross-section weights, t-stats in parentheses are calculated using white 
cross-section standard errors. Unbalanced panel of 20 countries; annual variances and covariances 
calculated using monthly data from 1960.01 to 1998.12; 
* and 
** indicate significance at respec-
tively 10% and 5% levels. 
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Table 6: Panel regressions: monthly data, small sample 
  vs $  vs $  vs $  vs DM  vs DM  vs DM 
            
constant 0.0004  0.0004  0.0003  0.0004  0.0004  0.0004 
 (5.44)  (5.62)  (5.83)  (5.50)  (5.75)  (4.86) 




 (0.49)  (0.73)  (0.94)  (2.05)  (2.09)  (2.39) 
var( )  y ∆ -0.010 -0.007 0.136
* -0.029
** -0.012 0.023 
 (0.85)  (0.47)  (1.83)  (3.22)  (0.96)  (0.34) 




 (0.80)  (0.95)  (0.95)  (3.28)  (3.31)  (3.30) 
var( )  IMF ∆  -0.000  -0.000  -0.003
** -0.003
**
   (0.93)  (0.00)    (2.75)  (3.47) 
covar( , )  m ∆  y ∆    14.02
**    -0.358 
     (2.59)      (0.08) 
covar( , )  m ∆  il ∆    -21.29      35.88
*
     (1.43)      (1.84) 
covar( , )  m ∆  IMF ∆    -0.486      -1.60
*
     (0.87)      (1.70) 
covar( , )  y ∆ il ∆    -1.877      4.49
**
     (1.06)      (2.03) 
covar( , )  y ∆ IMF ∆    -0.086      -0.001 
     (1.36)      (0.02) 
covar( , )  il ∆ IMF ∆    -0.902      -0.654 
     (1.18)      (1.02) 
            
# observations  216  216  216  216  216  216 
weighted adj. R
2 -0.13 -0.13 -0.10  0.06  0.07  0.12 
GLS estimation with cross-section weights, t-stats in parentheses are calculated using white 
cross-section standard errors. Balanced panel of 6 countries (Canada, France, Italy, UK, Australia 
and either the US or Germany); annual variances and covariances calculated using monthly data 
from 1963.01 to 1998.12; 
* and 
** indicate significance at respectively 10% and 5% levels. 
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Table 7: The interbellum 
 period  standard  deviation  mean 
   s ∆   m ∆    s ∆   m ∆   
Austria 21:05-22:12  23.85  12.87  26.09  23.11 
Belgium 20:07-26:11  8.08  2.08  1.00  1.27 
Denmark 20:08-26:05  4.65  1.88  -0.67  0.30 
Finland 20:08-24:01  11.14  2.54  1.16  0.90 
France 19:08-26:11  7.19  1.80  1.64  0.89 
Germany 19:08-24:10  105.14  97.07  41.15  38.69 
Italy 20:03-28:11  5.50  1.64  0.11  0.39 
Japan 20:08-28:11  2.63  6.48  0.09  0.52 
Netherlands 19:08-25:04  2.19  1.77  -0.07  0.30 
Norway 20:08-26:10  5.15  2.24  -0.52  0.20 
Spain 20:08-28:11  2.34  1.54  -0.05  0.57 
Sweden 19:08-25:04  2.66  2.64  -0.11  0.03 
Switzerland 20:08-24:10  2.18  2.46  -0.17  0.68 
United Kingdom  19:08-25:04  2.58  1.60  -0.11  0.38 
          
r with σ( )  s ∆    0.49    0.59 
tr    1.95    2.54 
r with µ( )  s ∆        0.82 
tr        5.04 
Note: standard deviations and means of log differences x 100; r is the rank correl-
ation. 
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Table 8: Post-Bretton Woods 
1974.01-1998.12 versus  US versus  Germany 
  s ∆   () my ∆ −    s ∆   () my ∆ −   
Australia 2.3  1.1  3.9  1.9 
Austria 2.7  2.6  2.7  3.1 
Belgium 3.4  3.9  1.3  3.8 
Canada 1.1  1.4  3.5  2.3 
Denmark 2.6  3.0  2.8  3.1 
Finland 2.5  2.5  3.1  3.0 
France 3.2  1.6  1.3  2.0 
Germany 3.3  1.9  0.0  0.0 
Greece 2.4  3.6  3.1  4.1 
Ireland 2.6  3.6  3.0  3.9 
Italy 3.2  2.4  2.2  2.9 
Japan 3.5  1.7  3.2  2.4 
Korea (South)  2.9  3.2  4.3  3.7 
Netherlands 3.3  2.9  0.5  3.3 
Norway 2.3  4.7  2.8  4.8 
Portugal 2.7  5.1  3.2  5.1 
South-Africa 3.2  3.2  4.2  3.6 
Spain 2.6  2.4  3.2  2.8 
Sweden 2.5  2.4  3.2  2.8 
Switzerland 3.1  2.8  3.0  3.2 
United Kingdom  3.2  1.6  2.7  2.2 
United States  0.0  0.0  3.3  1.9 
        
Average 2.8  2.7  2.9  3.1 
Standard deviation  0.6  1.1  0.9  0.9 
Note: standard deviations of log differences x 100. 
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Table 9: Some ERM Experiences 
   79.01-83.03 83.04-92.08 92.09-98.12 
France        
s ∆ excl. realignments  µ  0.20 0.08 -0.02 
  σ  0.67 0.47 0.63 
s ∆   µ  0.53 0.11 -0.02 
  σ  1.43 0.56 0.63 
() my ∆−    µ  0.47 -0.09 -0.47 
  σ  1.87 2.05 1.80 
    (- off on ii ∆ ) µ  -0.01 0.00 0.00 
  σ  0.31 0.08 0.05 
Italy        
s ∆ excl. realignments  µ  0.23 0.14 0.34 
  σ  0.95 0.68 2.72 
s ∆   µ  0.53 0.22 0.34 
  σ  1.35 0.86 2.46 
() my ∆−    µ  0.89 0.21 -0.32 
  σ  3.04 3.18 2.46 
    (- off on ii ∆ ) µ  -0.01 0.00 0.00 
  σ  0.30 0.08 0.03 
Netherlands        
s ∆ excl. realignments  µ  0.02 0.00 0.00 
  σ  0.67 0.21 0.13 
s ∆   µ  0.07 0.00 0.00 
  σ  0.72 0.21 0.13 
() my ∆−    µ  0.08 -0.08 -0.16 
  σ  2.81 4.15 3.05 
    (- off on ii ∆ ) µ  0.00 0.00 0.00 
  σ  0.10 0.03 0.02 
        
Note: all variables except   are vis á vis Germany.  ( - ) off on ii ∆
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Table 10: EMU countries and German provinces 
annual data 1990-1998  standard deviation of 
  s ∆   p ∆   m ∆    y ∆  
        
Austria 1.11  0.72  3.50  1.37 
Belgium 1.04  0.59  4.67  1.64 
Finland 7.68  1.77  3.84  5.36 
France 0.85  0.74  5.54  1.80 
Greece 5.78  3.98  3.31  2.36 
Ireland 5.58  2.02  5.23  3.56 
Italy 8.01  1.61  3.87  1.79 
Netherlands 0.29  1.08  2.86  1.86 
Portugal 4.24  2.51  5.52  1.52 
Spain 5.75  1.05  3.88  1.64 
        
Baden-Württemberg 0.00  0.43  2.33  1.14 
Bayern 0.00  0.37  1.81  0.79 
Bremen 0.00  0.39  2.88  1.58 
Hamburg 0.00  0.61  1.90  0.94 
Hessen 0.00  0.40  3.50  0.81 
Niedersachsen 0.00  0.34  2.92  1.07 
Rheinland-Pfalz 0.00  0.41  2.58  0.62 
Saarland 0.00  0.37  2.91  1.40 
Schleswig-Holstein 0.00  0.46 3.94 0.80 
       
r with  s ∆     0.74 0.45 0.71 
tr   4.57 2.08 4.18 
Note: all variables are vis á vis Nordrhein-Westfalen; standard deviations of log 
differences x 100. 
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Table A1: Data availability, monthly dataset 
  M   Y P il 
Australia 60:1-98:12  M1  60:1-98:12  60:2-98:12
3 60:1-98:12 
Austria 60:1-98:10  M1  60:1-98:12  60:1-98:12  71:1-98:12 
Belgium 64:1-98:12  M1
1 60:1-98:12 60:1-98:12 63:9-98:12 
Canada 60:1-98:12  M1  60:1-98:12  60:1-98:12  60:1-98:12 
Denmark 60:1-98:12  M1  74:1-98:12  67:1-98:12  60:1-98:12 
Finland 69:1-98:12  Currency  60:1-98:12  60:1-98:12  92:11-98:12 
France 60:1-98:12  M1  60:1-98:12  60:1-98:12  60:1-98:12 
Germany 61:1-98:12  M1  60:1-98:12  60:1-98:12  60:1-98:12 
Greece 68:12-98:12  Currency  60:1-98:12  60:1-98:12  86:5-88:12 
       97:5-98:12 
Ireland 67:1-98:12  Currency  60:1-98:12  60:2-98:12
3 64:1-98:12 
       
       
Italy 62:1-98:12  M1  60:1-98:12  60:1-98:12  60:1-98:12 
Japan 63:1-98:12  M1  60:1-98:12  60:1-98:12  66:11-98:12 
Korea 60:1-98:12  M1  60:1-98:12  70:1-98:12  73:5-98:12 
Netherlands 60:1-97:12  M1  60:1-98:12  60:1-98:12  64:11-98:12 
Norway 60:1-98:12  Broad  M  60:1-98:12  60:1-98:12  61:9-80:7 
       80:10-98:12 
Portugal 76:1-98:12  Currency  60:1-98:12  60:1-98:12  60:1-64:4 
       76:1-98:12 
South-Africa 60:1-91:6  M1  61:1-98:12  60:1-98:12  60:1-98:12 
  92:1-98:12      
Spain 62:1-98:12  M1  61:1-98:12  60:1-98:12  78:3-98:12 
Sweden 61:1-98:12  Broad  M  60:1-98:12  60:1-98:12  60:1-95:12 
Switzerland 60:1-98:12  M1  63:2-98:12  60:1-98:12  64:1-98:12 
UK 60:1-98:12  M0
2 60:1-98:12 60:1-98:12 60:1-98:12 
US 60:1-98:12  M1  60:1-98:12  60:1-98:12  60:1-98:12 
1Currency (line 34a) until 79:12, thereafter M1. Ratio-spliced. 
2Broad money (line 
35L) until 75:5, thereafter M0. Ratio-spliced.
 3Interpolated from quarterly data. 
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  33Figure 3: Percentage growth in demand deposits in nine regions of the US monetary union 
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